Last week, in my article, I examined the U.S. 2025 National Security Strategy issued by the second Trump administration and compared it to the 2022 NSS redacted by the Biden administration. These are public documents, and their importance is relative; a great power rarely fully discloses its objectives openly, and the goals outlined are mainly a wish list subject to constraints and imperatives. However, this ideological document — omissions aside — confirms a foreign policy strategy that first emerged during Trump’s initial term and is now in the implementation phase, allowing us to assess it against reality.
Throughout the week, more details emerged from an alleged classified version — likely for internal use, as is common — that outlines the formation of a G5 comprising the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and India, while excluding European countries. It also references Italy, Austria, Hungary, and Poland as potential allies in a plan to divide the European Union. These represent two possible initiatives aligned with the Trumpian vision that complement those in the publicly available document.
Pending further developments from these disclosures, this week I want to expand the discussion to include US foreign policy as a whole — of which the NSS is just one part — while also providing more historical background and highlighting the divided consensus around it.
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There is a naive way to interpret American foreign policy: as a line that shifts direction depending on the world, enemies, and opportunities. And then there is a more realistic geopolitical approach, which starts from within: from collective anxiety, crisis of trust, and fragmentation into groups and tribes that turn every external issue into an identity test. Seen this way, foreign policy is no longer just “strategy”: it becomes a tool for cohesion (or division) within the ruling coalition. When a nation loses its unity, it often projects its psychology — fears, resentments, myths of decline — onto the world. Ultimately, it ends up fighting its own symbolic civil wars abroad.
Trump’s second term is rooted exactly here: in an America tired of universalist dominance and, at the same time, unable to let go of the language of exceptionalism. It is here that foreign policy becomes a minefield for the conservative movement — an ecosystem now too complex to follow a single doctrine — and, similarly, for a left and liberal Democrats who have long swung between rights-based internationalism and impulses of retrenchment. The result is a typical paradox of transitional periods: everyone claims to have priorities, but no one can agree on a shared hierarchy.
This article outlines five key points for understanding U.S. foreign policy: (1) the transition from Bush to Biden; (2) the different Weltanschauungen within the conservative sphere; (3) the various “worldviews” within the American left; (4) similarities and differences across major issues; (5) the structural contradiction of the second Trump administration: shifting from a claim to dominate the world, which was never fully abandoned, to accepting spheres of influence, from endorsing alliance systems to engaging in purely transactional diplomacy. All of this is analyzed through a strictly geopolitical lens — with empathy for the actors, focusing on their interests, constraints, and perceptions of threats — not moralizing narratives.
1. The Historical Trajectory from Universalist Neoconservatism to Selective Retrenchment
1.1 Bush: Neoconservatism as a Grammar of Power
The Bush presidency marks a turning point, shifting unipolar dominance from containment to a proactive strategy: not just containing threats, but also ‘remaking’ regions. The 2002 National Security Strategy formalizes this shift by emphasizing preemption, the war on terror, and an assertive internationalism that links security to political change.
This phase creates two legacies that now harm both coalitions. The “forever wars” (such as Iraq and Afghanistan) weaken the legitimacy of the strategic elite — not necessarily because America “loses,” but because it wins tactically without establishing a lasting political order. It underscores the crisis of regime change and nation-building as goals. It also reflects the idea that American power is morally “obligated”: democracy and rule of law as exports, human rights as a mission, America as a global judge.
Here lies the first “impure” overlap between the neocon right and parts of the liberal-internationalist left: interventionism as a duty. The justifications differ — on one side, security; on the other, rights — but not necessarily the actions.
1.2 Obama: Pivot to Asia and Selective Retrenchment
Obama confronts the “imperial fatigue” and aims to rebalance American foreign policy by reducing emphasis on the Middle East, avoiding a resource drain, and shifting strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific. The phrase “America’s Pacific Century,” introduced in 2011, becomes the cultural manifesto of the pivot: the future of geopolitics will be shaped in Asia, not in Iraq.
But the pivot conflicts with reality: Libya, Syria, ISIS, and a Middle East that doesn’t “let America go.” Obama thus opts for a selective retreat, reducing the footprint, increasing drone strikes and special operations, and shifting costs onto regional allies. It is a compromise between two priorities: focusing on Asia while managing the chaos in the Middle East.
1.3 Trump I: “America First” as a Rejection of Universalism, not of Power
Trump’s first administration grapples with imperial fatigue, only to exacerbate it. Politically, it reflects the deep mood of disillusioned middle classes, delegitimized institutions, a sense of defeat in unnecessary wars, and resentment toward allies perceived as free riders.
The 2017 NSS already introduces concepts that are later emphasized in 2025: great-power competition, burden-sharing, a porous border, immigration, and cartels as threats to internal security.
Washington attempts to enforce burden-shifting, threatens NATO, and treats alliances like contracts. Yet it remains conflicted: it seeks to reduce commitments while projecting strength; it distrusts nation-building but relies on sanctions and economic pressure; it rejects global moral engineering but still champions American superiority as a bargaining tool.
1.4 Biden: The Return of the West and Ukraine as the Glue
Biden aims to rebuild a foreign policy based on alliances, multilateralism, and systemic competition with China and Russia. The 2022 NSS identifies China as the main challenger and Russia as the immediate threat, highlighting alliances as force multipliers and deterrence tools.
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine transforms this strategy into a stress test: Ukraine becomes the issue that unites the West and, at the same time, speeds up America’s internal divisions, especially on the right.
This trajectory points to the core issue: Trump is not just “another turn.” It marks the beginning of a different phase — a shift from being a universalist hegemon to a primary power, compelled to choose, negotiate, and act transactionally to prioritize — above all else — the American national interest.
2. The Many Rights: A Coalition Too Broad for One Foreign-Policy Doctrine
A common mistake is to view “the right” as a single entity. In reality, today’s American right is a complex ecosystem: think tanks, donors, legacy media, influencers, churches, online communities, economic elites, and subcultures. Legitimacy relies more on reputation than on organization. In such a fragmented system, foreign policy becomes a battlefield for internal power struggles.
2.1 GOP Establishment and Traditional Conservatives
The GOP establishment and the traditional conservatives — which includes old Washington networks, parts of Congress, the donor class, and the pro-Israel establishment — generally views NATO and Europe as the foundation of the Western order; Russia as a revisionist threat to be antagonized; China as a strategic rival requiring confrontation and containment; and Israel as an ally, proxy, and regional outpost (often motivated by domestic moral-political obligations).
The issue is that this worldview no longer resonates with a MAGA electorate that rejects the aesthetics of “elite wars” and with subcultures that specifically use Israel as an internal wedge. The Nick Fuentes/Groyper case is illustrative: antisemitism and anti-Israel rhetoric are not just “content,” but serve as boundary-setting tools to decide who belongs and who is excluded.
2.2 MAGA and National-Populists
MAGA often views foreign policy as wasteful and a betrayal of domestic interests. This leads to favoring swift conflict resolution (particularly in Ukraine), even if it involves using unconventional tactics. Tariffs and bilateral agreements are seen as natural means to project power, while migration and cartels are considered existential threats, justifying the launch of a “genuine” national security agenda.
This awareness is clearly reflected in the White House’s 2025 NSS: the administration states it cannot be “equally attentive to every region”. It suggests a hierarchy, core interests, and peripheral theaters managed selectively.
Here, the main principle emerges: the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine — the idea of reaffirming U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere and preventing outside powers from controlling strategic assets.
Geopolitically clear but causing domestic friction: the globalist right sees diminished influence; the ideological right experiences abandonment of their mission; the economic right worries about destabilizing protectionism.
2.3 The Tech Right
The tech right is often labeled as libertarian. However, the reality is more hybrid: it includes deregulation and domestic experimentation, but also a willingness to deploy the state as a strategic tool, especially in areas like defense, AI, supply chains, and tech security. The primary adversary is China: not just ideologically, but also in standards, production networks, semiconductors, AI, and data control.
In the 2025 NSS, the techno-economic emphasis is clear: reindustrialization, investment in emerging technologies, critical-chain security, and energy as a competitive advantage.
There is potential overlap with parts of the industrialist left under the “foreign policy for the middle class” label, but for different reasons: the tech right seeks dominance and speed; the left aims for jobs and social resilience.
Regarding Europe, the tech right not only emphasizes burden-sharing but also openly criticizes restrictions on freedoms. It calls for the allies to align culturally with the United States.
2.4 Fiscal Hawks, Deregulators, “Anti-State” Currents, MAHA
These currents follow a straightforward rule: external factors are acceptable if they help lower costs and boost autonomy. They tend to favor limiting permanent military commitments, using economic tools (though tariffs can be divisive), and prioritizing pharmaceutical and energy supply chains as essential to national security. Here, MAHA-type perspectives relate to supply-chain geopolitics.
These groups emphasize economic security as a key part of national security and stress the importance of not relying on foreign powers for essential components. The NSS 2025 reflects this view, but the contradiction is clear: reducing government while rebuilding industrial, energy, and technological sectors that require public coordination. It is a contradiction between ideology and strategic necessity.
2.5 The Religious Right
The religious right — especially evangelicals — has historically been a major supporter of Israel because of theological and identity reasons, viewing the Middle East and religious freedom as moral issues. This creates a conflict with parts of the “new right”: media populists trying to reduce the political risks of unconditional support for the Jewish State, and subcultures (Groypers, white supremacists, manosphere, etc.) that oppose Christian Zionism and lean toward anti-Israel or openly antisemitic views.
Here, foreign policy shifts into internal policing: Israel is discussed not as part of a regional strategy but as the ‘moral boundary’ of the movement. Antisemitism becomes both an identity marker and a tool of power among factions, with associated reputational costs and coordination challenges.
2.6 Individualist Libertarians
Libertarians are a “foreign body” disrupting coalitions: pro civil liberties, anti-war, anti-surveillance, and often anti-sanctions. Their main trait is non-interventionism and opposition to overseas military presence.
Convergence with the anti-imperialist left is possible but fragile: motivations differ (individual liberty versus internationalist/anti-capitalist solidarity). It is a “negative” convergence, opposing intervention rather than necessarily supporting an alternative plan.
2.7 Identitarian Supremacists and the Other Subcultures
The subcultures of the new right may be small in size. Still, they are powerful: they can dominate media coverage, generate internal pressure, and turn foreign policy into a cultural conflict. Groypers do not just carry “ideas”: they represent an aesthetic, a sense of belonging, a hierarchy, and an anxiety-driven psychology that seeks order and enemies.
On foreign policy, these subcultures oppose globalism as an elite conspiracy, exploit antisemitism to provoke the gatekeepers representing orthodox doctrine of the traditional right, flirt with ideas of “spheres of influence,” and distrust Atlanticism.
For the establishment, these subcultures pose a reputational risk; for populism, they represent both danger and energy. For the Groypers and the other similar tribes, stigma confirms their authenticity. They compete for narrative authority and the “moral center” of conservatism.
3. The Many Lefts: Rights Internationalism, Liberal Realism, and “Domestic America” as Priority
Here as well, considering “the left” a single entity is misleading. Liberal progressives, centrist moderates, and the radical left are separate groups.
3.1 Liberal Progressives
Liberal-progressives tend to view foreign policy as an extension of “rights” politics, encompassing issues such as minority and civil rights, climate initiatives, and multilateral cooperation. They often support “humanitarian” or “pro-democracy” interventionism, at least in principle, forming an unlikely alliance with neocons who share the same mission even if their motivation differs.
The interventionism of liberal progressives is guided by moral universalism rooted in human rights; the interventionism of neoconservatives is driven by geopolitics of competition and based on priorities, deterrence, and limited resources.
3.2 Centrist Moderates
Centrist-moderates promote a “balanced” foreign policy that combines intervention with multilateral efforts while avoiding excess. They serve as the sociopolitical backbone of the Biden approach: forming alliances as multipliers, supporting Ukraine as a defender of order, and engaging in competition with China through coalition-building.
This faction is shrinking and vulnerable to arguments from various new right groups: every prolonged war erodes their support; each domestic economic shock raises the question, “why we spend on military or waste resources abroad?”
3.3 Radical Left and Democratic Socialists
The Democratic-Socialist and Radical-Left movements criticize capitalism and structural inequality, advocating for a culture of resistance. In foreign policy, they criticize imperialism and “proxy wars,” show strong sensitivity to Palestine as a key identity issue within the Democratic Party, and remain suspicious of the military-industrial complex.
With this stance, they are moving toward alignment with libertarian non-interventionism; however, this convergence is purely tactical, and strategically, the groups remain far apart, positioned on the left and on the right of the political spectrum.
3.4 “Foreign Policy for the Middle Class”
After 2008 and the supply-chain crisis, a broader perspective emerged: foreign policy is connected to domestic resilience and should support it. This idea aligns with the hegemonic transition theory: less universalism, more selectivity, and a stronger focus on the political economy of power.
Here, a partial alignment between the democrats and the tech right emerges: the desire to contain China not just through fleets and alliances but also through industry, semiconductors, and technological standards. However, the difference between the two groups lies in methods and values: regulation, labor, and industrial welfare versus deregulation and acceleration.
4. A Dossier-Based Foreign Policy
To understand Trump’s new foreign policy, it’s helpful to view it as a collection of dossiers because that’s how Trump’s second administration seems to want to handle it: not through stable alliances but through flexible negotiating packages. Each dossier creates different coalitions, often crossing party lines.
4.1 The Middle East and Israel
On the right, Israel is the most unstable fault line because it combines strategy with internal morality. The religious right and pro-Israel establishment advocate for strong support; Israel is viewed as the West’s frontier. Much of populism prefers conditional backing, considering costs and public opinion. Groypers and the far right oppose Christian Zionism and use Israel and antisemitism as tools against the conservative establishment.
On the left, also, the Israel/Palestine conflict sparks differing opinions: liberal internationalists support a balance and Israel’s security, with the two-state solution as a secondary rhetorical goal; radical left and pro-Pal groups see Palestine as a moral litmus test; moderates worry about electoral unity and alliance strategies.
Geopolitically, the Jewish State also functions as a proxy node within a regional system: Israel’s internal divisions directly impact its external strategy, weakening any U.S. effort to “manage” the region through a single leverage.
Even if Washington tries to minimize its footprint, it remains caught in a trap: each escalation triggers domestic reactions (diaspora, campuses, donors, culture war) that come back as a political boomerang.
4.2 Ukraine and Russia
Here, the division is clear. The establishment right is Atlanticist: Ukraine tests NATO’s credibility. MAGA populists view Ukraine as an “elite war” and a pure drain. Libertarians oppose wars in principle. Tech right is more ambiguous: anti-Russia but focused on China, thus inclined to retrench in Europe and the Middle East to conserve resources.
On the left, liberal moderates support defending the order; the radical left criticizes escalation, highlights domestic social costs, and mistrusts militarization.
Trump, viewing the conflict through a “spheres” lens, sees this war as an issue to resolve quickly at any cost for Ukraine. The 2025 NSS clearly states that paying constant attention to the periphery is a mistake and emphasizes that the focus should be on core interests: China and the Western Hemisphere.
4.3 China and Taiwan
The Middle Kingdom and Taiwan are areas of broad consensus. Nearly everyone views China as a systemic challenge, but opinions vary on strategies and the level of risk. The tech right emphasizes competition over standards and speed in AI, chips, and data as a form of conflict. The Republican establishment supports maintaining and, if possible, strengthening alliances such as QUAD and AUKUS, along with deterrence. Populists back tariffs, decoupling, and bilateral pressure. The industrial left focuses on reshoring and resilience through regulation and labor protections.
“China risk” unites everyone. Obama’s pivot was based on the idea that the future is decided in Asia.
US–China competition is also systemic and exposes mutual internal vulnerabilities; Taiwan becomes not only a military risk but also a symbol of credibility and a reflection of supply chain fragility.
The 2025 NSS, as publicly outlined, emphasizes strengthening deterrence against a Taiwan conflict and highlights the crucial role of semiconductor supply chains, all within an America First framework.
4.4 Europe and NATO
Europe and NATO, this is where the second Trump administration most distinctly diverges from Western ecumenism.
The 2025 NSS addresses burden-sharing and burden-shifting and introduces a “Hague Commitment” of 5% of GDP for defense as a new standard. However, it also introduces a second, more destabilizing element: the requirement for the allies to undergo a cultural realignment. Additionally, it criticizes restrictions on free speech, democratic processes, migration policy in Europe, and even mentions European civilizational decline. This is the theme most emphasized in media coverage.
On the right, this creates a division among traditional Atlanticists (who fear Western disintegration), populists (who see Europe as a corrupt elite and a free rider), and the tech right (which uses free-speech rhetoric as a metapolitical tool).
On the left, Europe and NATO divide the political spectrum less for their values and more for their approach: militarization or diplomacy. Divisions deepen over Gaza and Ukraine on alternative strategies such as withdrawal versus open-ended support, between “just peace” and “dirty peace,” weakening progressive unity.
4.5 The Western Hemisphere
The Western Hemisphere has become the focus during Trump’s second term. The strategy document explicitly discusses a Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. It aims to restore U.S. hemispheric dominance: managing migration, blocking illegal flows, and strengthening an “American continent” supply chain. It even suggests rethinking military presence and taking actions against cartels, “including, where necessary, the use of lethal force.”
This document builds consensus on issues such as migration and crime. However, it emphasizes significant differences among factions regarding legality and escalation risks, relationships with Mexico and other regional partners, the use of the military for broader internal security missions, and the very idea of confronting “internal enemies.”
The hemispheric focus seems crucial. Here, the aim is to manage the Latin American diaspora and revive anti-communism. In this scenario, Florida becomes vital because it acts as a strategic link to Latin America. This is “domestic” geopolitics: the “foreign” is right in your backyard, and it reemerges as a foreign policy issue related to identity.
On energy, climate, and economy, polarization becomes almost ontological. The liberal left sees climate and energy transition as national security issues. In contrast, the Trumpian and techno-libertarian right support energy dominance to wield power and reject the Net Zero framework as a European-imposed strategic limit. The 2025 NSS openly addresses energy dominance, criticizing the EU.
Energy, climate, and the economy are crucial tools for gathering support both at home and abroad, creating temporary alliances around sanctions, energy exports, reshoring, and the capacity to maintain long-term competition with China and Russia.
5. Trump II
5.1 The New Official Language
The 2025 NSS aims to resolve its internal contradictions with a formula: being muscular and selective at the same time. It describes the posture as pragmatic and grounded in America First, emphasizing core interests: you can’t be everywhere at once. It then outlines three pillars: burden-sharing and burden-shifting (America leads but doesn’t bear the cost for others); realignment through peace (presidential diplomacy to resolve conflicts and realign regions with U.S. interests); and the economy as security (supply chains, industry, energy, and technology as tools of power).
It is a strategy for a worn-out hegemon aiming to maximize benefits and minimize overreach.
5.2 The Contradictions
The central contradiction is structural: pulling back from universalism lowers costs but increases systemic volatility. This volatility appears as shocks that come home to roost: migration, energy issues, inflation, supply chain disruptions, perceived weakness, and allied crises. Washington oscillates between accepting spheres of influence (especially in Eurasia), closing dossiers, reducing commitments, and reasserting dominance in the Western Hemisphere because nearby disorder is contagious.
But many other contradictions exist in current Washington foreign policy: the goal of global dominance persists, yet it now coexists with the logic of spheres of influence and issue-by-issue “dossiers”; the alliance system is not rejected, yet foreign policy becomes “purely transactional,” with shifting alliances; the universalist architecture created by the United States itself is not dismantled, but policy now functions through “contracts” as if it were not in place; the global order is not disavowed, yet local conflicts are managed in a dealmaking, businesslike manner.
5.3 The Divides
This posture divides the conservative movement more than it unites it because every right-wing family perceives a different risk from the shift. Neocon Atlanticists worry about domino effects that could weaken credibility, deterrence, and alliances. Populists are concerned about being pulled back into elite conflicts. The religious right fears a decline in values-based support for Israel. The tech right worries about systemic instability that might slow America’s technological progress. Libertarians fear the rise of the “security state” and internal conflicts like cartels, border issues, and migration. Radical subcultures exploit every ambiguity for internal battles.
The creation of the new right is a hegemonic effort: it involves narrative authority, institutional capacity, and mobilization power. Foreign policy is one of its main battlegrounds because it determines who represents the coalition’s “moral center.”
5.4 The Florida Factor
Florida is where populist rebellion and elite coordination intersect: Mar-a-Lago serves as both an operational base and a symbolic center. This is important because Trumpism is not just a doctrine; it is a power ecosystem. Ecosystems operate on incentives: donors, media, reputation, and mobilization. In such an ecosystem, foreign policy quickly becomes a loyalty indicator, a tool to delegitimize internal rivals, and raw material for culture wars.
The result is that external strategy cannot be purely rational or completely coherent: it must also be narratively compatible with the tribes that maintain the coalition.
6. Conclusion: The Geopolitics of Internal Cohesion
If I had to summarize the current phase in one sentence, it would be: the United States is shifting from dominance to negotiation. It signals a move toward a more fluid and competitive world divided into spheres of influence, a G-Zero where American power remains unmatched but shared direction diminishes, and chaos emerges.
In this context, internal disagreements over foreign policy are not minor; they reflect a fundamental power dynamic. A superpower can accept tactical inconsistencies, but not a prolonged internal Cold War over its strategic identity. The U.S. is experiencing a “psychopolitics of anxiety”: it cannot turn anxiety into a strategy and often treats strategy as a form of identity therapy, debating each issue as if it were a moral judgment.
Trump’s second term, with its selective and transactional diplomacy, aims to leverage this situation: it promises peace and cost savings but resorts to force and coercion when voters see immediate threats (hemisphere, border, cartels), demands more from allies while evaluating their “cultural health.”
It reflects a foreign policy typical of a worn-out empire, but one that is structurally fragile: lacking stable allies and a predictable perimeter, every crisis becomes a high-stakes negotiation, and every negotiation inevitably ends in division back home.
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